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Abstract
Industry 4.0 facilitates dynamic production processes
for highly tailored individual products that require
intense cooperation between different organisations.
The enabler of such cooperation are cyber-physical
systems (CPSs). A set of policies also considering dy-
namic changes of a request context during runtime
has to protect the confidentiality of involved systems.
Analysing policy effectiveness already during design
time can avoid costly confidentiality flaws. However,
the changes that can be evaluated during design time
are not clear. Therefore, we identified typical dynamic
changes from use cases we gathered with two indus-
trial partners and categorized them accordingly.
1 Introduction
As part of Industry 4.0, the manufacturing process un-
dergoes a digital transformation: machines and sen-
sors communicate with each other or human opera-
tors. Communication is no longer restricted to a sin-
gle organization but includes all participants through-
out the whole production process, including suppliers
and customers [5]. Therefore, it spreads multiple dif-
ferent organization. This leads to further automa-
tion of the manufacturing process that requires new
complex processes and complex systems. Both have
to adapt to dynamically changing production envi-
ronments to maintain automation despite of changing
requirements or incidents. For instance, the produc-
tion process has to shift the workload from a bro-
ken machine to other ones to minimize production
loss. This also requires adjusting the access control
policies to allow workers to enter new floors or let
maintenance staff access more detailed information of
the broken machine. Future generation cyber-physical
systems (CPSs) might provide the functionality for
this transformation [5].
The downside of intense cross-organisation commu-
nication or Industry 4.0 in general are potential con-
fidentiality issues [10]. For instance, logging data of a
machine might leak details of the production process
or names of operating workers. Therefore CPSs must
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only share them with relevant participants.
Design time analyses are beneficial for early de-
tection and cost-efficient correction of confidentiality
issues in systems. However, design time analyses can-
not predict the impact of every change. Therefore, a
classification of dynamic changes is needed.
In this paper, we analyse use cases and confiden-
tiality requirements for next-generation CPSs that we
created together with two industrial partners, which
are active in the Industry 4.0 environment. We fo-
cused on confidentiality and tested our results for con-
fidentiality examples. However, the results might fit
for other quality aspects as well. First, we identi-
fied dynamic changes, which we define in Section 2.
Second, we derive a categorization for confidential-
ity affecting changes in Section 3 that consists of two
dimensions: change type and type level. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 Definition of Dynamic Changes
We focus on dynamic changes that affect confidential-
ity. We define dynamic changes, which design-time
analyses can handle, as follows:
A dynamic change can be every context change dur-
ing runtime, which is detectable during runtime and
foreseeable during design-time.
We derived the focus on context changes in the first
part of the definition from a context-aware role-based
access control approach [9] for pervasive computing
systems. This fits to confidentiality because access
control systems are a commonly applied mechanism
to establish confidentiality by means of policies and
policy enforcement. As described in the approach,
such context changes are highly dynamic, i.e. they
can occur often and in an unpredictable time during
runtime. The context of a software system consists
of ambient conditions of the system and participants.
The physical location of entities is a good example
of these ambient conditions that Zhang and Parashar
[2] consider to be relevant as well. Besides the ambi-
ent conditions, Kulkarni and Tripathi [9] see dynamic
integration of services or resources into a software sys-
tem as a dynamic change of the context. This is con-
sistent with Dougherty et al. [3] who include changes
of the software system into the dynamic system con-
text. For instance, a change of a component during
runtime can lead to different results of the applica-
tion that now require different measures to preserve
confidentiality.
The second part of the definition is the detec-
tion during runtime. Without the ability to detect
a change, the system cannot react to it and adapt
policies to maintain confidentiality.
While dynamic changes happen in an unpredictable
time during runtime, the range of possible changes
still has to be known during design time of the policies.
Otherwise, incorporating the changes in the policies is
not possible. For instance, a redeployment of a com-
ponent can happen at an unpredictable time during
runtime based on decisions of a cloud hosting provider.
Anyway, the software designer knows possible deploy-
ment targets because of a service-level agreement with
the cloud provider. These types of changes match the
definition of programmed changes of Endler [1]. Such
changes are known and foreseen during design time
but happen during runtime. Therefore changes must
be foreseeable during design-time. An analysis using
this definition shows first promising results [8].
The definition does not guarantee predictability of
change impacts during desing time. One reason for
this could be missing input data or expressiveness of
the used underlying models.
3 Categories of Dynamic Changes
We analyzed different use cases and requirements [6,
7] based on our definition in Section 2 to identify dy-
namic change categories. We created categories for
dynamic changes based on our findings.
3.1 Categories
Based on the different use cases and requirements, we
identified two dimensions: the changed entity and the
type level. We found five categories in the first dimen-
sion and two in the second. The five categories of the
first dimension are as follows.
Actors are similar to subjects in access control [4]
that interact with the system, such as humans, orga-
nizations, or machines.
Input is the information or data object we insert
into the system.
Ambient conditions are attributes directly de-
rived from the environment such as the physical lo-
cation or the current time.
Results of operations describe dependencies to
previous operations. The order of operation execu-
tions might change the confidentiality of information.
State of the System describes changes based on
the current state of the system or business process.
In the second dimension, we distinguish between
type-level information and identity information. In
case of a worker, the role would be the type level and
the particular worker would be the identity informa-
tion. While design time analyses can easily handle
type-level information, the analyses on the identity
level might be more complicated. For the identity
level, the specific information might be missing since
the system usually does not run yet.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a definition of dynamic
changes and created a categorization of dynamic
changes with an impact on confidentiality of the sys-
tem afterwards. The categorization is based on use
cases defined with industrial partners.
The categorization provides security analysts with
a starting point for systematically investigating po-
tential confidentiality flaws of CPSs and their envi-
ronment when moving to Industry 4.0.
In the future, we want to extend our categorization
for not planned dynamic changes, which will add a
certain amount of uncertainty.
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